Arizona provides a compelling test of legislative representation because of its mixed system of representation. Arizona has had multiple-member districts (MMD) in the House and single-member districts (SMD) in the Senate since the reapportionment revolution of the 1960s. As a result of a court-ordered plan, Arizona has 30 legislative districts, each of which is represented by 2 house members and 1 senator (Berman 1998 ). In the House elections, each voter has two votes. The two candidates who receive the most votes win. Voters cannot use both votes on one candidate, but they may choose to cast their first vote and abstain with their second. In the Senate, it is the traditional oneperson/one-vote, first-past-the-post, winner-take-all system. Senators and representatives are elected from districts with the same geographical boundaries and have the same age and residency requirements. Although Arizona is only one state, we do not feel that this is a limitation of our study. As Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2002: 6) note, "At times, the focus on a particular state may be justified because its unique attributes provide for the most rigorous test of the theoretical proposition under consideration." Because of the comparability of the two chambers, we believe that Arizona provides a unique opportunity to test the effects of multiplemember districts.
Does the MMD system in the House produce different legislative behavior than the SMD system of the Senate? To test for such effects, we develop a measure of ideology for Arizona state legislators and compare the distribution between the two chambers. We test the thesis that MMDs produce more ideologically diverse legislators than SMDs (Cox 1990) .
We then conduct a study of legislative voting for both chambers in the Arizona State Legislature to assess whether the institutional difference affects legislative decisionmaking. In particular, we develop voting models and test them with votes on higher education policy in the 44th legislature in Arizona. We examine higher education policy votes for Because no interest group voting support score similar to the ADA measure exists for the state of Arizona, we developed an additive scale of interest group support based on published endorsements of eight interest groups in Arizona. We employ the endorsements of 4 conservative and 4 liberal interest groups to determine a legislator's ideology. The conservative groups are the National Federation of Independent Business, AMIGOS (pro business mining suppliers), the Arizona Realtor Association, and Arizona Right to Life. The liberal groups are the AFL-CIO, Arizona Education Association, AFSCME (government workers), and the Sierra Club. For each liberal endorsement a legislator receives a score of one (+1), while an endorsement from a conservative group results in a negative one (-1). Therefore, a 4 indicates an 1We want to thank an anonymous journal referee for raising the issue of whether the Illinois system was a true MMD system with the party requirement and whether it was therefore a fair test of ideological extremism.
empirical studies of the ideological impact of MMDs in state The moderates are in the range from -2 to +2. This coding system puts more legislators into the moderate category so it makes moderation look more prevalent, but it also provides a more stern test of the extremism hypothesis.
To further assess the impact of the two electoral systems, we compare the legislators representing the same district with a few different tests. First, is the senator's ideological score more moderate or extreme when compared to the average ideological score of the two House members from that same district? If the average House score is further away from zero than the senator's score, it would suggest that the House members from that district are more extreme than the senator. For example, two House members with scores of 0 and 4 (or an average of 2) are more extreme than a senator with a score of 1. In 15 of the 30 districts the average ideological score of the House delegation is more extreme than the senator's score. In 4 districts the scores are equal, and in the remaining 11 districts the senators are more extreme.
Another method of testing the differences between the ideologies of the two chambers is to compare the differences between the individual members in each district. We compare the ideological score for each House member to the corresponding senator from the same district. Again, extremism is defined as absolute distance from zero. This test shows that 47 percent of individual House members are more extreme than their corresponding senator. Twenty-eight percent are less extreme and the remaining 25 percent have the same level of extremism as the senator from their district. We believe that these findings support our hypothesis.
The two chambers also differ in the level of moderation within both party caucuses. For Republicans, the House caucus is somewhat more conservative than the senate caucus. Almost three-fourths of the House Republican caucus is in the conservative range of -4 to -2, but only about half of the Republican senators are in the conservative range and a quarter of the Republican senators are in the moderate to liberal range (0 to +2). We did not report the intercepts for the different levels of the ordinal dependent variable.
LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION IN A SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICT SYSTEM
The division between the Democratic caucuses (the minority in both chambers) is even more pronounced. To determine if these findings on the ideological extremity of the MMD House hold up when other variables are added to the equation, we estimated an ordered logistic regression model for the ideological extremism of an Arizona state legislator. Taking the absolute value of the ideology score as the dependent variable (ranging from a moderate at zero to an extremist at 4), we developed a model that included chamber membership, constituency characteristics, and legislator attributes.
As the results in Table 1 suggest, the chamber variable has a negative impact on ideological extremism. The chamber variable is coded so that the Senate equals 1 and the House equals 0 so the negative coefficient supports the hypothesis that the MMD system produces more ideological extremism. The odds ratio suggests that membership in the SMD Senate makes a legislator over 50 percent less likely to be an ideological extremist than a member of the MMD House.
Looking at the control variables, one can see that district characteristics have some impact. A rural legislator is less likely to be an extremist, but legislators from districts with a high percent of whites tend to be more extremist. On the other hand, the legislator's education is the only significant legislator attribute, and legislators with a college degree are less likely to be extremists. Neither party affiliation nor the legislator's sex affects ideological extremism. We do not intend to discuss the control variables in great depth, but it is important to point out that senate membership has a significant negative effect despite the presence of control variables.
The differences found across these various tests indicate a decided impact of the MMD system in the House versus the SMD system of the Senate. Consistent with theory, we find that the MMD system produces more ideologically extreme legislators. To test how legislators represent the interests of their districts, we examine voting on higher education policy in the Arizona legislature. This allows us to identify the specific constituency characteristics influencing legislative voting on issues facing the public university system of Arizona. The University of Arizona, Arizona State University (ASU), and Northern Arizona University (NAU) comprise the state system, which is governed by the Arizona Board of Regents (ABOR). Universities, with their students, faculty, staff, and research, provide a significant economic impact to their city, county, and region, and we hypothesize that legislators are aware of constituent interests and act accordingly Our dependent variables are the votes of 60 House members and 30 senators on six bills considered during the 44th Arizona legislature.4 We pooled the votes from each chamber separately due to the small sample size for any single vote in the Senate, and then we tested for vote-specific differences by employing vote dummy variables in the model. None of the vote dummies were significant so we did not report them in the table. Further, we ran the pooled model for each chamber with one of the votes excluded to see if any significant changes in the coefficients occurred. We found no significant differences by dropping any of the bills. Bills SB1065, SB1148, SB1081 and HB2657 were voted on in the first regular session in 1999, and all of them passed and were signed by the governor. SB1065 provided over $4 million dollars to the University of Arizona for infrastructure improvements, and SB1148 funded a wastewater improvement project at NAU. SB1081 required state universities to establish performance based incentives programs, and HB2657 mandated that ABOR could not increase tuition without first having a public meeting to discuss the change.
DATA AND METHODS FOR THE VOTING
The bills from the second session in 2000 are SB1079 and HB2284. Senate Bill 1079 gave $1 million to NAU to improve its biology building, and it was passed by the legislature and signed by the governor. House Bill 2284, which was vetoed by the governor, would have provided $2.5 million to ASU for infrastructure lease or purchase. The bill descriptions and votes were taken from the Arizona legislature's web page (ALIS). Because the votes are yes/no dichotomies, we employ logistic regression analysis to assess the factors that predict support of higher education in the Arizona House.
There are three categories of independent variables: constituency characteristics, legislator characteristics, and legislator ideology. Previous research has used differing constituency characteristics as predictors of legislative voting ( Garand 1996). We employed four variables to test for the impact of constituency interests: median household income, percent of the district with a college degree, minority percentage, and percent of the district who are recipients of social security benefits.
The data for college education, median household income, minority percent and the percent of social security recipients were taken from State Legislative Elections: Voting Patterns and Demographics (Barone, Lilley, and DeFranco 1998). We hypothesize that the percent of the district with a college degree is positively related to votes in support of higher education. Legislators with highly educated districts may be more likely to support higher education because it is important to their constituents. Conversely, median household income is expected to be negatively related to higher education support. Higher income citizens may be more likely to oppose higher taxes to support education expenditures because they can afford to send their children to private universities or out-of-state institutions.
The constituency minority measure is the percentage of African-Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, and Native Americans in a legislative district.5 It is difficult to predict the direction of the coefficient for the minority variable. Because whites typically experience higher levels of education, they may be more supportive of higher education but not necessarily public institutions. On the other hand, minorities may see public education as an equalizer that allows for greater economic opportunities. Therefore, we expect legislators from districts with a higher percent of minorities to be more supportive of public higher education.
Social Security percentage is the proportion of recipients of social security benefits in a district. Because elderly constituents are not as likely to benefit from higher education either directly (by going to school themselves) or indirectly (by paying for their children to go), it is hypothesized that the social security percent should be negatively related to support for higher education policy.
Several studies have found significant effects of legislator attributes in shaping legislative votes (Jackson and King 1989; Thomas 1991; Reingold 1992; Wink, Livingston, and Garand 1996). In our study we employ two individual legislator characteristics: sex and whether the legislator has a college degree. The data for legislator characteristics were 5 Unfortunately for the state of Arizona, the Barone data set omits a category for Native Americans, and we know of no other data set for ethnicity by state legislative district. To compensate for this problem, we used county level census data and assumed that the percent of Native Americans was the same percent for each district or portion of a district in the county For most of the counties, Native Americans make up less than 5 percent of the population, but there are a couple with half or more of the county population. If a district takes in 1000 people from a county with 50 percent Native Americans, we assume that the district has 500 Native Americans from that county We then sum up each county's contribution to the district population (so 500 from county A and 400 from county B) and then determine the percent Native American for the entire district. This figure is then added to the overall minority percent. For the vast majority of districts there was a slight shift, but for a couple of districts the change was sizable. The first value in the table is the coefficient. The second value (in parentheses) is the standard error, and the third value is the odds ratio.
LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION IN A SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICT SYSTEM
The dummy variable for each vote is not reported, but none were significant. taken from the Guide to the 44th Legislature published by the Arizona News Service (1999). First, the legislator's sex is a dummy variable with female equal to 1 and male equal to 0. Other studies have found that female legislators are more likely to support education (Thomas 1991; Reingold 1992 ). Second, the legislator's education level is a dummy variable (0 = some college or less; 1 = college degree or more). Legislators who are more educated are predicted to be more likely to support higher education.
A final independent variable is legislator ideology. Typically, studies at the congressional level employ a measure of interest group support, such as the ADA score for a legislator, as a proxy for ideology (Bullock and In this section, we seek to answer two questions related to representation in the Arizona legislature. First, which factors are significant in shaping legislative decisionmaking on higher education policy? Second, do the more ideologically extreme representatives in the multiple-member House use ideology differently than legislators in the single-member Senate?
In assessing the overall models (see Table 2 ), one can see that the logistic regression results are robust. The model chisquare for each is significant, and the percent correctly predicted range from 71 percent to 87 percent. Therefore, we can begin to assess the impact of each of the independent variables in the models.6
Examining the results for the Senate first, one can see that two of the constituency variables are significant and in the expected direction. First, consistent with expectations, the percent of the district population with a college degree is positively and significantly related to support for higher education. The odds ratio of 1.2 indicates that for each extra unit (or one percentage point) of the population with a college degree, the legislator is about 20 percent more likely to vote for higher education. Further, the median household income of the district is negatively related to support for higher education, which corresponds to our hypothesis. Higher income citizens may have less of a personal connection to public educational institutions, and this result supports that idea. Finally, the other two constituency variables (minority percent and percent of citizens receiving social security) were not significant.
The two legislator attribute variables do not attain significance, and both are contrary to expectations. We expected that because of personal experience a legislator with a college degree would be more likely to appreciate the functions and needs of a university and support those institutions. In this case, either personal experience works against the universities, or, more likely, constituency concerns are the overriding factor shaping decisionmaking. Also of some surprise, 6 In addition to the variables reported in Conversely, examining the model for the ideologically extreme MMD House, one can see that the ideology measure is the only variable to attain significance at the .05 probability level. The odds ratio of 1.2 indicates that for each one-unit change in the ideology scale (toward liberalism), a legislator becomes 20 percent more likely to support higher education. This result stands in stark contrast to the Senate, and it is reinforced by the absence of other significant effects in the House.
None of the legislator attribute variables are significant in the House model, and the only constituency variable to approach significance (at the .10 level) is the minority percent. Districts with a higher percent of minorities are more likely to vote against higher education in the House. This result may be largely a matter of competition over funding. Arizona has an extensive community college system that is not a part of the ABOR system, and money that is directed toward ABOR schools may detract from the amount that could be spent on the community college system, which may have a greater impact on minority students. In addition, money spent on ABOR schools may affect the funding of other social spending programs that minorities may be more likely to support. Overall, constituency interests do not have much of an impact on Arizona House members.
The results suggest that constituency interests matter greatly in Senate decisionmaking but not much in the House. Further, legislator attributes do not significantly affect legislative voting decisions in either the Senate or the House. Finally, it appears that ideology is the dominant force shaping decisionmaking in the MMD House, but it is not a significant influence in the SMD Senate.
CONCLUSION
In this article we answer the call of Moncrief, Thompson, and Cassie (1996) who suggest that more research on representation needs to be performed at the state level. In particular, we compare representation in the multiple-member Arizona House to the single-member system of the Arizona senate, which allows us to test hypotheses regarding the impact of MMDs on ideological extremism. Arizona provides a particularly useful laboratory because the SMD Senate and the MMD House have identical district boundaries, residency requirements, age limits, and length of able to test whether the unique institutional structure of Arizona translates into different voting patterns. Downsian (1957) theory suggests that single-member districts will produce moderate legislators. In contrast Adams (1996) , Cox (1990) , and others (Dow 1998; Magar, Rosenbloom and Samuels 1998) suggest that in order to stake out a particular constituency, legislators in MMDs are driven to ideological extremes. Using several different measures, our findings support this hypothesis. Legislators in the MMD House are more likely than members of the SMD Senate to reside on the extreme ends of the ideological spectrum and much less likely to be moderates. These differences hold even when controlling for legislator attributes and constituency characteristics. In short, our findings confirm what has long been suspected-MMDs in the state legislature produce more ideologically extreme legislators. Does this extremity have an effect on legislative voting patterns? Our examination of voting on higher education policy in Arizona suggests that it does. We find that legislators in the MMD House rely on ideology at the expense of other factors in voting on higher education policy. Conversely, senators in a SMD system primarily use constituency characteristics and not ideology to shape decisionmaking on higher education. This suggests powerful effects of the multi-member system. Future research should continue investigating representation in the states as suggested by Moncrief, Thompson, and Cassie (1996). The states offer a myriad of opportunities to test and develop models of representation. Moreover, is it always the case that MMDs produce a different representational experience than SMDs? What are the implications of this finding? Further, are constituency characteristics as important for other less salient issues facing state legislators in SMDs? Is ideology always such a dominant force in multiple-member legislatures ? We believe that this article adds to the extant literature in several ways. First, we heed the call of Moncrief, Thompson, and Cassie (1996) to revive this area of study on state legislative decisionmaking. Second, we test whether multiple-member electoral systems produce more ideologically extreme legislative chambers and party caucuses in the chambers than single-member systems. Third, we apply models of decisionmaking that have been conducted almost exclusively for legislatures with single-member district systems to a legislature with multiple-member districts. Fourth, we find that not only is the multiple-member House more ideologically extreme, it uses ideology at the expense of constituency characteristics. Alternatively, the singlemember Senate is just the opposite on both counts.
